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abstract Critics of commercial societies complain that the free-market system of
property rights and freedom of contract tends to commodify relationships,
thus eroding the bonds of personal and civic friendship. I argue that this thesis
rests on a misunderstanding of both markets and friendship. As voluntary,
reciprocal relationships, market relationships and friendship share important
properties. Like all relations and activities that exercise important human
capacities and play an important role in a meaningful life, market relations
and activities are essentially structured and supported by ethical norms and, in
turn, support these norms. The so-called norms of the market, such as
instrumentality and fungibility, come in varying degrees and characterize not
only market, but also nonmarket, relationships, including friendship.
Furthermore, although market relationships are primarily instrumental, the
individuals involved are not. The virtues of markets have their counterparts in
friendship, as do their vices. For these and other reasons, market societies are
not only not inimical to friendship, they create a more secure matrix for civic
and personal friendship, as well as for other important values such as art,
science, or philosophy, than any other developed form of society.
keywords commercial societies, friendship, moral norms, virtues, vices
1. Commercial societies and their critics
1.1.
Are commercial societies unfriendly to friendship? Many critics of commercial
societies, from both the left and the right, have thought so. They claim that the
free-market system of property rights, freedom of contract, and other liberty
rights (the ‘negative’ right of individuals to peacefully pursue their own ends) is
impersonal and dehumanizing, or even inherently divisive and adversarial. Yet
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(their complaint goes) the psychology and morality of markets and liberty rights
pervade far too many relationships in a commercial society, eroding the bonds of
personal and civic friendship.
My main aim in this article is to analyze and evaluate this claim. In this
section, I will give an overview of the critics’ complaints against various features
of the free-market system, discuss the empirical data that might be thought to
support their complaints, and show why they largely fail to do so. In Section 2, I
will get to the heart of the matter: the nature of the market and of friendship. I
will address the thesis that the modes of valuation proper to production are radi-
cally opposed to the modes of valuation proper to friendship, love, sexuality, and
so on, arguing that the thesis rests on a misunderstanding of both markets and
friendship. A proper understanding of the two reveals that, as voluntary, recipro-
cal relationships, market relationships and friendship share important moral and
psychological properties, and are not the natural enemies, or even the odd bed-
fellows, many critics take them to be. In Section 3, I will address the related
thesis that market societies (societies based on the free-market system of property
rights, freedom of contract, and other liberty rights) tend to commodify relation-
ships and, thereby, weaken the bonds of personal and civic friendship. I will
argue that free markets are the most powerful force for decommodifying or, more
generally (since commodification is not the only way of objectifying people), de-
objectifying people and relationships. Hence, market societies are not only not at
odds with friendship, they create a more secure matrix for civic and personal
friendship than any other developed form of society.1 Indeed, market societies
provide such a matrix not only for friendship, but also for many other important
values, such as art, science, and philosophy.
Marx set the tone for the criticisms in question when he declared that the
relations of production in a market economy turn the worker’s labor into a com-
modity, thus alienating him from himself and his fellow-men, and creating
endemic conflicts of interest. This political economy is sustained by the bour-
geois ideology of rights, which, Marx declaims, are the rights of the ‘circum-
scribed individual’, of ‘egoistic man’ isolated from the community.2 In the ideal
society, presumably, people would give to each other out of love, with no need
to stand on their rights. To paraphrase the hero of the 1970 movie, Love Story, in
such a society love would mean never having to say, ‘Sorry, that’s mine.’
In a similar vein, Erich Fromm argues that market societies have created a
‘marketing orientation’ that leads people to see themselves and others as com-
modities for exchange.3 He is joined by contemporary critics such as Sybil
Schwarzenbach, Elizabeth Anderson, and Margaret Radin, who see similar
dangers in market societies. Thus, Schwarzenbach complains that market soci-
eties wrongly emphasize production or poiesis over action or praxis, to which,
allegedly, belongs the creation and nurturance of relationships.4 Again, while
Anderson acknowledges that market societies have done much to liberate people
from the tyrannies of class and status, and that many, many things are ‘properly
politics, philosophy & economics 7(3)
302
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
regarded as pure commodities’, she cautions that, unless market freedoms are
limited, the tentacles of commodification will spread through civil society to
strangle other forms of valuation, including the intrinsic valuation of friendship.5
Similarly, Margaret Radin warns that proposals for universal commodification
(the freedom to buy and sell whatever people might want to buy and sell)
presuppose and will lead to an inferior form of flourishing.6 All three call for
political measures to limit commodification by (further) limiting property rights
and freedom of contract for the sake of protecting or promoting friendship or a
higher form of flourishing.
Communitarians also bemoan the alleged loss of the virtues of community,
especially political community, in the United States, calling for a ‘politics of the
common good’ to replace the ‘politics of rights and competing interests’.7 A
politics of rights, they say, has created ‘atomistic’ individuals who have no stake
in participating in the life of their political community.8 These sentiments are
anticipated by the 20th-century Southern conservative intellectual, Richard
Weaver, who deplores ‘the anonymity and the social indifference of [the] urban
man’ held together only by ‘the cash nexus’, and who writes feelingly of ‘the
rooted culture’ of the South, in which each person ‘working in his sphere went to
make up a whole’ with ‘a common bond of feeling’.9
From across the political spectrum, the critics of commercial societies present
us with a picture of a society in which people meet in the marketplace (shopping
malls, internet auctions, restaurants, and banks) to buy and sell, striking the best
deals for themselves, and then going their own separate ways. At best, these
visitors to the marketplace abide by what Fromm calls the ‘fairness ethic’,
eschewing force and fraud in their transactions, and respecting each other’s rights
to live their lives as they see fit.10 But they meet and part as indifferent strangers,
with no sense of a shared destiny or shared responsibilities. Insofar as they have
any interest in politics, their interest is largely partisan and factional. On this
picture, civic friendship is conspicuous by its absence from the economic and
political life of commercial societies or, at least, in permanent danger from the
‘marketing orientation’ encouraged by such societies.
1.2.
How far is this picture true of life in commercial societies in general and America
in particular, where the ideology of individual rights and free markets is probably
stronger than anywhere else? Judging from some well-known facts of American
life and the spate of articles and books on the sorry state of American society, the
picture seems depressingly accurate. Libertarian, left-liberal, communitarian, and
conservative critics may all point with dismay at the phenomenon of business
interests lobbying local, state, and federal governments for special favors in the
form of subsidies or protections, or outright appropriation of others’ property,
even as they cloak their demands in the rhetoric of protecting free markets and
the right to economic opportunity. Communitarians and others may give as an
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example of a politics of competing interests the litigiousness of American
society, with legions of trial lawyers enriching themselves by nobly defending
the ‘right’ of their helpless and hapless clients to be protected from the evil
blandishments of fattening foods.11 Some liberals, such as Anderson and Radin
(and, no doubt, many conservatives and communitarians), deplore the relatively
new phenomenon of contract pregnancy or surrogate motherhood for improperly
commodifying female reproductive labor or children.12 If contract pregnancy
were to be widely accepted, Anderson argues, it ‘would change the way people
(parents and brokers) value children generally – from being worthy of love by
their parents and respect by others, to being sometimes the alienated objects of
commercial profit-making’.13 Radin also argues that widespread commodifica-
tion of surrogate motherhood might have a rhetorical ‘domino effect’ that leads
people to think of women’s attributes, especially their reproductive capacities,
and of children as commodities.14 Similarly, commodified sex (prostitution)
debases a gift value,15 not only for those who buy and sell sex, but also for others,
because it both stems from and encourages a debased attitude toward women’s
sexuality in the personal sphere.16 ‘The same masculine sexual desire’, states
Anderson, ‘is gratified in personal and commodified sexual relations.’17
Again, Schwarzenbach presents the ‘disintegration of traditional (Bourgeois)
familial relations, and staggering rates of systemic homelessness, drug depend-
ency, illiteracy, and so forth’18 as evidence of a breakdown of civic and personal
friendship. She claims that the emphasis on liberty rights and production is partly
responsible for the damage to friendship, and that the damage can be undone only
by moving away from liberty rights and production.19 More generally, critics can
point at the impressive empirical evidence marshaled by Robert Putnam in
support of his thesis that social capital has declined since the 1950s.20 For
although Putnam attributes the decline to the privatizing effects of TV, the two-
career family, and other factors, rather than to market norms, one could argue that
these factors themselves are ultimately due to the prevalence of market norms.
The gloomy critics, then, seem to be right in complaining that civic and per-
sonal friendship in America are in the doldrums, while (and because) markets
intrude where they have no business to be, and liberty rights flourish. It would be
hasty, however, to accept this dismal conclusion about American society on the
basis of the evidence adduced above, much less to generalize it to all commercial
societies. For this picture of the loveless society is misleadingly incomplete.
Moreover, many of the problems it identifies illustrate not the workings of free
markets or the ethics of liberty rights, but, rather, of their violation or disregard.
The fairness ethics of rights and markets assumes that individuals are free and
responsible beings capable of interacting with each other in the marketplace and
elsewhere as equals.21 Nothing in this ethics supports the politics of favoritism and
corporate welfare engaged in by business lobbies and politicians eager for votes.
Indeed, to use the coercive power of the state to take from Paul (the taxpayer) and
give to Peter (the private business) what Peter cannot get voluntarily from Paul
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(the customer) is to engage in the mirror opposite of a market transaction. In addi-
tion, while the free-market system leaves people free to sue fast-food joints for
seducing them with their greasy burgers, its ethics of fairness and individual
responsibility do not support their claim to have been innocent victims.
Again, even if it is true that the practices and attitudes of the surrogacy indus-
try are inconsistent with the surrogate’s autonomy and with the respect and con-
sideration due to her,22 it does not follow that the practices and attitudes of the
parties to the contract are always inconsistent with the surrogate’s autonomy and
the respect or consideration due to her. Many women who become surrogates do
so autonomously, and many couples for whom they are carrying the child
develop emotional ties to the surrogates and treat them with respect and con-
sideration. Nor is the baby a mere commodity for the mother or anyone else.
Anderson and Radin, however, object even to partial commodification of the
baby.23 But why should partial commodification be objectionable if the child is
treated well both during pregnancy and after birth? Marriage also, after all, is
partially commodified, not to mention the professions, art, and almost anything
with a legal status. Perhaps Anderson’s fundamental objection is that the surro-
gate gives up the child for her own sake, not the child’s, and that this is incon-
sistent with parental love.24 But it is hard to see how the surrogate can be said to
be acting only for her own sake, not the child’s, given that she is giving up the
child to the loving care of its parents.
Let us, however, grant Anderson and Radin their claim that surrogacy involves
a debasement in attitudes toward motherhood, pregnancy, and children. Is this a
good reason to believe, as they also claim, that if surrogacy is not banned and
becomes widespread, it will have a domino effect and lead to such a debasement
even among those not involved in surrogacy arrangements? Not really. Such a
sweeping statement about the effects of a certain practice and policy on others
needs a strong empirical basis in psychology and sociology, a basis that neither
author supplies. The same applies to Anderson’s claim about prostitution leading
to a general debasement of sexuality, and to Schwarzenbach’s claim about the
emphasis on liberty rights and economic production leading to the breakdown of
friendship. As we shall see, Anderson and Schwarzenbach also argue that the
modes of valuation proper to pure economic goods or production are radically
opposed to the modes of valuation proper to friendship, love, sexuality, and so
on. But even if they are right about this radical opposition in the modes of valu-
ation proper to each sphere (and I will argue in Section 2 that they are not), it does
not follow that if we do not limit market freedoms, market valuations will spread
through all spheres of life and strangle other forms of valuation (if we legalize
pot, will we cease to value anything but pot?). Whether this will happen is an
empirical question, and in Section 3 I give reasons to think that the tendency of
market societies has always been to encourage other forms of valuation, not to
strangle them.
Finally, while Putnam’s work undoubtedly points to features of American
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society that almost anyone would regard as problematic, his overall picture of
American society has been criticized by many as being misleading.25 Moreover,
Putnam’s central thesis, that there has been a decline in social capital since the
1950s, is vitiated by the fact that, as Steven Durlauf points out, his conception of
social capital is multiply ambiguous.26 Sometimes Putnam uses ‘social capital’ to
mean ‘connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’,27 sometimes to mean a
sense of ‘fraternity’,28 and sometimes to mean networks understood simply as
channels for the flow of information.29 Thus, Putnam counts political activities
such as voting and working for political parties, or membership in labor unions,
as social capital. But voting and membership in labor unions need not create a
sense of fraternity, and the sense of fraternity among those who work for the
same political party is counterbalanced by the adversarial feelings toward people
working for opposition political parties.
In sum, although in some ways American society (like other societies) is a
society of mutually indifferent or even antagonistic individuals, the negative
picture often painted of it is a highly selective and, thereby, distorted one. For a
balanced view, we also need to look at the positive picture.
1.3.
No one who has recently ventured from his study into the terrestrial or cyber-
agora or other public spaces of America, or cast an eye on the patterns of personal
relationships, can fail to be struck by the variety of flourishing communities:
book clubs, neighborhood associations, support groups for victims of crime or
disease, ‘nonprofits’ that seek to protect various freedoms from the coercive
actions of the state here and abroad, and organizations that make it their mission
to teach self-sufficiency and relieve hunger in remote regions of the world. There
are also astoundingly high levels of private charity, levels that have risen steadily
from US$7.70 billion in 1955 to an incredible US$260.28 billion in 2005, with
76.5 percent of it coming from individuals.30 An unbiased observer also cannot
fail to see signs of a national sense of belonging to a single political-cultural
community: the hundreds of think tanks dedicated to analyzing and solving the
problems of ‘our’ society, the innumerable print, radio, and TV magazines doing
the same, and the many organizations teaching the fundamental constitutional
principles of this country. Even the multimillion-dollar support by charitable
foundations for Putnam’s research into the breakdown of community was, at least
in part, an expression of concern for the American community. These observa-
tions are borne out by extensive research that leads Robert Wuthnow to conclude
that although communities have become looser and more fluid, they are no less
extensive than before.31 In short, Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation in
Democracy in America that Americans are a society of joiners still holds true.32
Many of the communities of yesteryear have disappeared, but they have been
replaced by a variety of new ones.
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1.4.
Nevertheless, these criticisms of commercial societies cannot be met simply by
correcting the one-sided picture critics sometimes give of American society or
pointing out their mistaken causal analyses of the ills of American society. For it
may still be the case that there is something about the psychology of market rela-
tions that is antagonistic to the bonds of community, family, and friendship. This
might explain why the lament over the breakdown of these bonds has been
sounded repeatedly since the very dawn of commercial society in 18th-century
England and Scotland. No less a figure than Adam Ferguson, who at first criti-
cizes pre-commercial society for its pervasive competitiveness in all relation-
ships, later warns against the passing of tight-knit communities and the coming
of a society in which community members may ‘have no common affairs to
transact but those of trade’.33 Similar warnings are repeated by Marx and
Ferdinand Tönnies34 a century later, by Weaver in the mid-20th century, by
Fromm in the 1940s and 1950s, and by Anderson, Schwarzenbach, and Radin in
contemporary times. Some of these critics apotheosize pre-commercial societies
or herald the brave new world of the post-capitalist future, others simply want to
make market societies safe for ‘the higher things’ in life. But all agree that the
orientation or mode of valuation proper to market transactions is hostile to the
mode of valuation proper to personal and civic friendship, so that wherever you
have the first, you have a weakening, or even demise, of the second. An adequate
response to these critics requires analyzing this thesis of the psychology of
market relations. Anderson offers the most developed argument for this thesis, so
I will start with a description of her argument.
2. Market norms and the norms of friendship
2.1.
The modes of valuation proper to market production and market relations,
Anderson argues, are radically opposed to the modes of valuation proper to
friendship, love, sexuality, and so on. We value pure commodities and market
relations only insofar as they are useful as means to our independently defined
ends, whereas we value the latter as ends in themselves.35 But use ‘is a lower,
impersonal, and exclusive mode of valuation’ that sees things as fungible and
capable of being ‘traded with equanimity for any other commodity at some
price’.36 This stands in contrast to respect, appreciation, or love, which are modes
of valuation for entities and relationships that are seen as having intrinsic, irre-
placeable value. Similarly, Schwarzenbach argues that instrumental productive
activity (poiesis) is a lower form of activity than the noninstrumental activity
(praxis) of love and care (epimeleia). It is, again, because of the instrumentality
and fungibility (‘market-alienability’) of commodities that Radin fears that
permitting universal commodification, with its market rhetoric and market
methodology, would lead us to think even of personal relationships and attributes
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of personhood as commodities. All three writers conclude that we should limit
economic liberties through prohibition or regulation of certain markets as a way
of expressing the intrinsic value we place on persons and personal or civic rela-
tionships and preventing market norms from spreading.37
Since goods and relations can be commodified to different degrees, it is useful
to start with what Anderson calls pure economic goods and relations. A pure
economic good, says Anderson, is a good whose ‘production, distribution, and
enjoyment are properly governed’ by market norms and whose value ‘can be
fully realized through use’.38 A pure economic good is a pure commodity, prop-
erly valued as a mere means to ‘independently defined ends’.39 The market norms
that ‘exclusively’ govern its production, distribution, and enjoyment have ‘five
features that express the attitudes surrounding use and embody the economic
ideal of freedom: they are impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and
oriented to “exit” rather than “voice”’.40 Schwarzenbach echoes some of the
same claims. The ‘proper concern’ of production, she says, is ‘with its product
(and only indirectly with human relations or needs); [and] its incentive is usually
exclusive, private ownership or benefit to the self’.41 Thus, economic rights such
as the right to private property and the right to contract promote ‘selfish’ behav-
ior, in contrast to welfare rights, which promote the nurturing, ‘reproductive’
activities of civic friendship.42
These claims about the nature of commodities and market relations may be
illustrated by the following imaginary, everyday market transaction. When I give
US$2 to the street vendor in exchange for a hot dog, I am justified in seeing 
and valuing the transaction and my US$2 simply as a means to my gustatory 
satisfaction. My relationship to the vendor is impersonal, in that we have no
knowledge of, or concern for, each other’s social status or character. The rela-
tionship also seems to be purely egoistic, insofar as both the street vendor and I
seem to be concerned only with our own independently defined interests, with no
regard for each other’s interests (except as means to our own interests). For all
these reasons, the goods exchanged (the money and the hot dog) as well as my
relationship to the vendor are entirely fungible: any vendor on the street who
made a good hot dog would have done equally well, as would any hot dog from
his cart in exchange for any two dollar bills from my wallet. Our relationship is
also exclusive, want-regarding, and oriented to exit rather than voice. The vendor
and I have exclusive rights to the goods exchanged, which are distinct and not
shared, we both respond to each other’s wants without asking if these wants are
worthy (he does not quiz me about the nutritional value of my daily diet and I do
not quiz him about the worth of his occupation), and we both know that, as
market actors, we can influence each other’s behavior chiefly through trade or a
refusal to trade – a simple ‘take it or leave it’ (exit).
It should be easy to see the differences between my relationship to the vendor
and a close friendship. Both involve an exchange of goods, but in friendship these
goods, as Anderson puts it, are ‘jointly realized’, and are ‘not merely used but
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cherished and appreciated, for they are expressions of shared understandings,
affections, and commitments’.43 Further, they can be exchanged only as gifts, and
they aim ‘to realize a shared good in the relationship itself, whereas market
exchange aims to realize distinct goods for each party’ (ibid., p. 151). Presum-
ably, Anderson does not mean that no good in a friendship is distinct or sepa-
rately realized, but that the goods central to friendship, such as trust, affection,
sympathy, and companionship, are shared and jointly realized. What makes
something a shared good is not only that it is enjoyed with others, but that it is
enjoyed ‘according to shared understandings of what it means’.44 Moreover, even
though both gift and market exchanges require reciprocity, the form and timing
differ. In friendship we expect reciprocity ‘only in the long term’, for ‘gifts are
given for the friend’s sake, not merely for the sake of obtaining some good for
oneself in return’.45 Schwarzenbach also stresses that the ‘proper goal’ of repro-
ductive praxis ‘in the best case’ is not ‘exclusive private ownership but a shared
appropriation of the human world’ and ‘unselfish satisfaction’.46
The psychology of friendships, then, seems radically different from the psy-
chology of market relationships. Hence, one can understand the alarm of those
who think that if market rhetoric and market norms were to spread into all areas
of life, they would replace (as both Marx and Thomas Carlyle complained) the
‘human nexus’ with the ‘cash nexus’. Before we join in the alarm, however, we
need to ask the following questions.
2.2.
Is the kind of relationship with the hot dog vendor I used above to illustrate
market norms paradigmatic of market relations, or are there many kinds of
market relations? Even if the vendor relationship is paradigmatic of market rela-
tions, is it a purely commodified relationship (that is, governed only by the
market norms just described) or is it also essentially governed by certain norms
it shares with non-commodified relationships, including certain forms of friend-
ship? To be sure, if a market relationship concerning the production or exchange
of a pure commodity is defined as a purely commodified relationship, then the
answer must be that the vendor relationship is purely commodified and that it
shares no norms with friendship. But this answer, as I argue below, cannot be
right; for although there are pure commodities and purely commodified relation-
ships (such as the slave master’s to the slave or the hostage-taker’s to the
hostage), there can be no purely commodified market relationships.47 Again, even
if economic activities concerning the production or exchange of pure commodi-
ties can be properly valued entirely instrumentally, can they not also be properly
valued as ends? Finally, even if the value of some economic activities is entirely
instrumental, are they necessarily inferior to ‘friendship activities’, or is this an
unwarranted conclusion? If these criticisms of commercial activities and rela-
tions are mistaken, then the claim that the norms governing them are at odds 
with the norms governing intrinsic goods such as parental love, sexuality, or,
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more generally, love and friendship, is ill-conceived, as is the proposal to limit
(further) property rights and freedom of contract for the sake of preventing a
general devaluation of intrinsic values.
I will argue that market relations come in many stripes, but none is entirely
commodified because none is entirely instrumental. Moreover, like all relations
and activities that exercise important human capacities and play an important role
in a meaningful life, market relations and activities are essentially structured and
supported by ethical norms and, in turn, support these norms. If the ethically
bleak picture of market relations given by its critics seems right at first sight, it
is because it largely fits many simple, everyday transactions such as buying 
hot dogs from unknown street vendors. But the minimalistic picture does not
completely describe even such transactions (Section 3 below), which, in any
case, are not paradigmatic of market relations. Furthermore, as the following
examples show, to the extent that this picture is true of the vendor relationship, it
is also true of many nonmarket relationships. So the sharp dichotomy between
market and nonmarket relationships is called into question from both sides:
market relationships are not entirely instrumental, and nonmarket relationships
are often largely instrumental.
2.3.
Consider the relationship of two previously unacquainted club members playing
a game of squash. The value of the relationship to them is primarily instrumental.
They are playing each other only for the sake of a good, invigorating game, and
any other club member who played equally well would have served their pur-
poses just as well, regardless of his character or social status. Consider, again, the
relationship of an audience to unknown actors in a play. The play itself may have
aesthetic, psychological, and moral value, but the actors’ value to the audience is
primarily instrumental, lying in how well they play their parts. The audience is
there exclusively for its own enjoyment or enlightenment, and any other cast of
actors that could play the parts as well would have been just as welcome, regard-
less of their individual identities. Hence, these nonmarket relationships are no
different from my market relationship to the unknown hot dog vendor: both 
are equally instrumental, impersonal, egoistic, fungible, want-regarding, and 
oriented to exit rather than voice.
It might be thought that since the alleged nonmarket relationships are them-
selves based on market transactions (a fee for club membership and a ticket for
the play), my comparison does not really make my point. The underlying market
transactions, however, do not affect my argument, because the instrumentality,
impersonality, fungibility, and so on would obtain, for the reasons given above,
even if the club membership or play were free. This suggests that the crucial 
factor in making the vendor–buyer relationship largely instrumental and so on is
not that it is a market relationship, but that it is a transient exchange relationship
between strangers. Hence, other things being equal, we should expect instru-
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mentality, impersonality, and so on to vary with the length and depth of an
exchange relationship. To see this, let us imagine that the two squash players,
having enjoyed the first unplanned game, decide to play together regularly. Even
if their interaction is limited to squash interspersed with occasional pleasantries,
even if their knowledge of each other’s character and personality is strictly 
limited to their comportment on the squash court, if they like each other and miss
seeing each other when one of them cannot make it, their relationship has turned
into a friendship – of the sort that Aristotle calls a ‘pleasure friendship’.48 And so,
even though the relationship is still primarily an instrumental, exchange relation-
ship, in the sense that it would not endure if one of them lost interest in squash
or became unable to play, it is less instrumental and fungible than before, because
another equally good player would not do just as well.
The same process occurs in market relationships, such as between street
vendors or workers in grocery stores and their regular clients. As the interactions
extend over time and the faces become familiar, a mutual and active liking, pleas-
ure, and goodwill replace the abstract goodwill that most of us bear toward
strangers. The market relationships have now become, to borrow Aristotle’s
term, ‘utility friendships’ – friendships based on utility.49 Indeed, sometimes the
friendship aspect of the relationship can even be dominant, as when the market
exchange simply serves as an occasion for a friendly visit.50 If another street
vendor or store-owner were to take the place of this one, there would be a sense
of loss, even if, in time, the sense of loss disappeared.
More sustained market relations give rise to more sustained utility friendships
that the Romans called necessitudo – friendships based on the necessity of the
situation. As Adam Smith puts it:
Among well-disposed people, the necessity or conveniency of mutual accommodation,
very frequently produces a friendship not unlike that which takes place among those
who are born to live in the same family. Colleagues in office, partners in trade, call one
another brothers; and frequently feel towards one another as if they really were so.51
Business partners often develop a friendship on the basis of their shared interests
and cooperation at work, as do representatives of businesses that rely on each
other’s products and work closely together. Their mutual liking, goodwill, and
pleasure in each other’s company create loyalties that may even sometimes get in
the way of their business interests.52 Hence, even though (by hypothesis) their
friendship would not last if their interests changed, their sense of loss would be
greater than that of the utility friends described above. This makes their friend-
ship even less instrumental, fungible, and so on.
But it is not only qua friendships that these long-term business relationships
differ from transient exchange relationships in their degree of instrumentality,
fungibility, and so on. They differ even qua business relationships. All coopera-
tive market relationships are based on shared interests, but business partners and
interdependent businesses also shape each other’s interests to a significant extent.
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Their market exchanges aim to realize not only distinct, exclusive goods for each
party, but also the shared good of the joint or interdependent business enterprise.
In such businesses, the parties involved also care about each other’s character,
since their business dealings require mutual trust and trustworthiness. Indeed,
some businesses go to great lengths to get to know their clients’ trustworthiness.
For example, Lloyd’s of London required their big business clients to visit them
for several days each year, even if this required sailing across the Atlantic. In
addition, trust based on personal knowledge and a complex private system of
social and business sanctions plays a crucial role in the diamond trade among
Jewish merchants in New York, who close deals worth millions of dollars with
nothing more than a verbal promise or a handshake.53 Contrary to Anderson,
then, even though these business relationships concern trade in pure commodi-
ties, they are neither impersonal nor egoistic, and the parties do not regard each
other or their relationships as easily replaceable.
These examples show three things we need to do to understand the nature of
market relations. First, we need to consider different kinds of market relations,
not only transient vendor–seller-type relations. Second, we need to consider them
in the context of nonmarket relations of various kinds, such as the audience–actor
relation, and not only in the context of friendships. Third, we need to consider
them in the context of different kinds of friendships, not only in the context of
intimate, committed friendships based on the friends’ characters and personali-
ties. When we modulate our inquiry in this fashion, we can see that the features
of instrumentality, fungibility, impersonality, and so on are neither peculiar to
market relations, nor an all-or-nothing affair; rather, they are present in varying
degrees in both market and nonmarket relationships, including friendship. We
can also see that the psychology of market relations not only does not necessarily
militate against friendship, it often gives rise to friendship, because awareness of
mutual advantage naturally creates amicable feelings.
This returns me to a point I have discussed only briefly. I pointed out above
that, like a committed friendship, a long-term business relationship is also a
shared good, made up of mutual trust, understanding, and commitment from the
parties to the relationship. But in fact, to some extent all exchange relations of
mutual advantage, even transient ones, are shared goods, even though the goods
they exchange are exclusive and distinct. Sellers and buyers in a market shape
each other’s interests, and share an interest in the continuation of a relationship
of mutual advantage.54 Indeed, as a network of nonexclusive, mutually advanta-
geous relations held together by a mutual awareness of these advantages and a
shared understanding of its principles, the market itself is a shared good.
We may conclude, then, that any view that makes a sharp dichotomy between
market norms and the norms of friendship rests on too blunt an understanding of
both markets and friendships. This is not to say that there are no important dif-
ferences between them. The most important difference is that, whatever the per-
sonal value of a business relationship (the enjoyment, the mutual learning, or the
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psychological support) insofar as it is a business relationship, it is primarily a
means to the success of the business. Hence, for example, partners who contin-
ued their partnership even after it became harmful to their business, or companies
that continued trading even if they gained nothing from the trade, would, in eco-
nomic terms, be simply irrational (even if their actions were rational all things
considered by virtue of other overriding reasons). Good business relationships
qua business relationships must be primarily instrumental. By contrast, the best
friendships must be primarily ends in themselves. Schwarzenbach takes this to
imply that friendships belong to a higher moral plane than business relationships
or, indeed, than any commercial activity.
2.4.
Schwarzenbach appeals to Aristotle to distinguish between praxis as action that
has its end within itself and necessarily conveys character and poiesis as action
that has its end outside itself and does not convey character.55 Friendship activi-
ties are forms of praxis motivated by ‘shared’ concerns and ‘unselfish satisfac-
tion’, whereas economic activities are forms of poiesis motivated ‘usually’ by
exclusive, private, selfish concerns.56 She concludes from these premises that
economic productive activities are morally inferior to the ‘reproductive’ activi-
ties of friendship.
I have already argued that many of the alleged differences between productive
activity and friendship are either nonexistent or highly exaggerated. But even if
we grant all of Schwarzenbach’s premises, her conclusion does not follow, as
shown by the following analogy. Many scientific activities are exclusive and pri-
marily means to the end of some human need or desire, and all scientific and
artistic activities are concerned only indirectly with human relationships. But it
is clearly false to think that scientific and artistic activities are inferior to rela-
tionship activities. Moreover, unless we can defend the dubious Aristotelian
assumption that only the good can love each other as ends, the mere fact that a
relationship is an end in itself does not guarantee its moral worth, for it might 
be based on a shared commitment to some evil vision.57 Hence, we must also
reject the undefended (though distressingly widespread) assumption made by
Schwarzenbach and other authors, namely, that shared activities are inherently
better than unshared activities: the former may be evil and the latter deeply
worthwhile.
Schwarzenbach seems to think that all rational (chosen) activities that ‘go
toward reproducing a particular set of relationships between persons over time’,
such as cooking for one’s family, playing with one’s children, and the other
activities that ‘women have traditionally performed in the home’, are instances of
‘reproductive praxis’.58 But this definition of reproductive praxis turns even pro-
ductive activities into praxis. For surely a woman might cook only for the sake
of feeding her children and not at all for its own sake, or take a job only for the
sake of supporting her children and herself and not at all because she likes it.
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Recognizing this, Schwarzenbach then states that many of these activities ‘can be
performed as ends in themselves’.59 But this implicitly acknowledges that some
rational (chosen) activities that ‘go toward reproducing a particular set of rela-
tionships between persons over time’ need not be performed as ends.
In any case, some things are much better done as means, even mere means,
than as ends. A mother who potty-trained her children as an end in itself would
be doing her children no favor, and one who punished them as an end would be
sadistic. The insistence that doing something as an end is always better than
doing it as a means amounts to ‘end-fetishism’. Indeed, contra Schwarzenbach’s
(and Anderson’s) claims, even when something is properly regarded as an end, it
is not always morally higher or more important than the means to it. Consider my
relationship to the hot dog vendor. I enter into the relationship only as a means
to the end of my gustatory satisfaction. But in certain respects the relationship
(how I treat and am treated by the vendor) is more important than my enjoyment
of the hot dog. The reason is obvious: people are more important ends than any-
one’s gustatory satisfaction. The deeper point, generalizable to all morally legit-
imate human relationships, is that even relationships that come into being for
purely instrumental reasons have a noninstrumental dimension, because people
are not mere instruments to each other’s ends, but ends in themselves. A rela-
tionship that fails to recognize this is a relationship of predator and victim, or
mutual predators and victims, not a relationship of voluntary trade.
None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a
human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is
unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives
from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the
ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships, and so on, then it could
fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But there is no
reason to think that production is only a means to these ends (although its role as a
means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from
heaven). To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence, as Schwarzenbach
and other critics do, is to show a serious misunderstanding of its role in a good
human life. People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of
reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production (proving theorems,
writing treatises, and making music) or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake
of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises.
Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreci-
ates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance
of productiveness as such. ‘Productiveness’, he states, ‘is man’s ability to use his
powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him’,60 and again,
‘Productiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his
powers and as the “actor”; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the
same time that they are not masked and alienated from him.’61
When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human poten-
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tiality and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we
can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile
activities, including market activities. And then we can understand why, for
instance, a philosophy PhD would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing
skateboards ‘adorned with uplifting art’.62 Worthwhile activity in any sphere
exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of
worth and, thereby, engages and reshapes our identity. This is at least one reason
why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a
long-term scientific enterprise – or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial
activities as ‘poiesis’ and friendship as ‘praxis’ distorts the nature of both busi-
ness enterprises and friendships.
The fact that economic activities and relationships play an important role in a
meaningful life implies that the market can no more be adequately described in
morally neutral terms than can friendship: moral norms inform all worthwhile
human activities. Economic activity, as Ludwig von Mises argues, must be under-
stood in the context of a general theory of human action.63 In the next section, I
will argue that the fairness ethics that structures the market has been and is a
powerful force for promoting end values, and that the so-called faults of the free
market are simply the faults of free human beings in every sphere of action.
3. The ethics of the market
3.1.
As we have seen, Fromm acknowledges that the market could not exist without
the ethics of fairness, with its prohibition of force and fraud and the principle of
equal exchange in goods and feelings. But he thinks that fairness ethics has
nothing to say to those with nothing to trade, for it neither endorses nor prohibits
love of neighbor or charity. The ethics needed by friendship and community, he
holds, is the ethics of Judaism and Christianity, which requires that you ‘love
your neighbor, that is . . . feel responsible for and one with him’.64
The fact that fairness ethics is not a complete ethics is, however, neither here
nor there. The ethics of universal love is not a complete ethics either, and attempts
to make it so by reducing all ethical concepts to love are either implausible or not
genuine reductions, since they simply reproduce the putatively rejected distinc-
tions within the general category of love. Furthermore, fairness ethics is far from
negligible, as Fromm’s dismissive tone suggests. On the contrary, it is of the first
importance in all voluntary, reciprocal relationships, including personal and civic
friendship. For all such relationships involve the exchange of something deemed
by the parties to be worth exchanging, whether this be a material good, a valuable
idea, an entertaining conversation, or a lovable self. A fair exchange of goods or
feelings requires a sense of fairness, honesty, trustworthiness, and the ability for
trust. Even in a transient relationship, such as the vendor–buyer or squash-partner
relationship, although neither party cares about the other’s overall character, both
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parties care about each other’s reliability as traders or partners and behavior.
Moreover, such ongoing fair exchanges not only presuppose trust and trust-
worthiness, they generate further trust and trustworthiness, thereby providing the
necessary matrix for the flourishing of civic friendship.
3.2.
This is not to say that all is well in the marketplace. Much that is deemed worth
trading in the market may express morally repugnant values or be detrimental to
the well-being of consumers on any plausible conception of human well-being.
The proliferation of multicolored snake oils masquerading as nutritional supple-
ments or instant cures is only one obvious example. But snake oils are hardly
inventions of the free-market  system, and are at least usually less dangerous and
more pleasant than the exorcisms or potions of our ancestors. The surrogacy
industry’s frequent lack of respect and consideration for the surrogate mother and
her reproductive labor is another example of a morally repugnant attitude (see
Section 1.2). Even this, however, is not a product of the free-market system. In
many pre-commercial societies, not only the value of women’s reproductive
labor, but their very value as human beings has been, and continues to be, meas-
ured by their ability to produce healthy sons, with rejection or ill-treatment by the
husband and his family as the frequent price for failing in this function. My
general point here is that morally repugnant values or actions are not limited to
commercial societies or the realm of commerce: they exist in the press, the
podium, the pulpit, and politics, as well as friendships and communities. As the
feminist writer, Adrienne Rich, observes, ‘We assume that politicians are with-
out honor. We read their statements trying to crack the code.’65 For although
‘Men have been expected to tell the truth about facts, not about feelings . . . even
about facts they have continually lied.’
We are familiar with the way businesses sometimes exploit customers’ or
competitors’ trust or short-sightedness with misleadingly worded contracts or ads
or with bait and switch techniques. We are also familiar with fly-by-night
schemes and counterfeit coin. But each of these has its counterpart not only, say,
in politics and religion, but also in friendship. A friendship can be fraught with
misleading subtexts or outright deceptions. Rich describes a woman who lies in
her personal relationships: ‘A subject is raised which the liar wishes buried. She
has to go downstairs, her parking meter will have run out. Or, there is a telephone
call she ought to have made an hour ago.’66 Again, ‘She is asked, point-blank, a
question which may lead into painful talk: “How do you feel about what is
happening between us?” Instead of trying to describe her feelings in their ambigu-
ity and confusion, she asks, “How do you feel?” . . . Then the liar learns more 
than she tells’ (p. 475) and gains power over her friend. Again, like a counterfeiter
or fly-by-night businessman, one person may pretend to befriend another for 
who he is when what he really desires is some monetary or professional advan-
tage. Such a person, says Aristotle, is worse than ‘debasers of the currency’,
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because in debasing the currency of friendship, he ‘debases something more 
precious’.67
It might be thought that even though human beings wrong each other in all
realms of life, there is still a difference between friendship and commerce,
namely, that manipulation or exploitation of customers’ ignorance, fear, or short-
sightedness that stops short of outright fraud is regarded as fair play in com-
merce, but not in friendship.68
In order to consider this objection properly, one must first distinguish between,
say, misleading ads, on the one hand, and ads that make no attempt to hide the
fact that they are ‘dressing up’ their products to make them more attractive rather
than to mislead the customer (for example, despite the picture advertising the
latest perfume, no one can possibly take it to claim that a woman who wears it
will be mobbed by men). Such attempts are no more dishonest or exploitative
than getting dressed up for a date (for example, no one can seriously believe that
women have naturally bright-red lips or pink fingernails). Again, it is hard to see
the deception in the Shane Company’s former advert, ‘Now you have a friend in
the diamond business.’ For on the one hand, no one can seriously take that to
mean that he has a buddy at the company he can just call up for a casual chat
(although one person apparently did),69 and, on the other, anyone would be right
to believe that he will find someone friendly at the Shane Company eager to
make a mutually profitable deal rather than to gyp him. By contrast, ads that, with
the clever use of emphasis and omission, make it sound (falsely) as though the
advertised product is both one-of-a-kind and indispensable to your well-being,
without uttering a single literal falsehood, are examples of objectionable forms
of exploitation and manipulation that stop short of outright fraud. To quote Rich
again, ‘Lying is done with words, but also with silence.’70
But is it true that such subtle deceptions and manipulations are regarded as fair
play in commerce, but not in friendship, as the critic alleges? No doubt some
people hold that all bluffing that is not outright fraud is ‘fair’ in commerce as it
is in poker, but not everyone does.71 Moreover, attitudes toward deception and
manipulation in personal relationships also vary. Most people hold that subtle
deceptions and manipulations in intimate non-erotic friendships are wrong, but
not everyone does. In addition, many people believe that some kinds of decep-
tions or manipulations are perfectly fair in romantic or marital friendships.
Indeed, it is in love (and war), not in commerce, that the common adage claims
that all is fair. Again, many people hold that to protect a close friend’s interests,
it is justifiable to deceive or manipulate a lesser friend, an innocent stranger, or a
business. Indeed, some people go further and justify even outright lying or cheat-
ing in these contexts. But if deliberately inflicting a cost on people by mislead-
ing, manipulating, or cheating them is wrong, except under very special circum-
stances (and every non-rigorist in ethics must allow some exceptions), then it is
wrong whether they are close friends, lovers, lesser friends, strangers, businesses,
or customers, regardless of what some or most people think.72
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In both markets and friendship, however, these manipulations and exploita-
tions are exceptions to the rule; neither markets nor friendship would exist if they
were the rule. Misleading advertising inflicts a cost on the business by inviting
skepticism; and when misleading advertising is conjoined with the widespread
business policy of ensuring customer satisfaction by accepting returns, it inflicts
a further cost on the business. Moreover, just as the virtues of honesty, trust-
worthiness, and reciprocity are partly constitutive of friendship, they are partly
constitutive of market relationships. Hence, just as to the extent that someone
‘debases the currency of friendship’ he is deficient as a friend or, at the extreme,
not a friend at all, so to the extent that a practice debases the currency of open
and voluntary exchange, it is deficient as a market relationship and, at the
extreme, not a market relationship at all.
The faults that exist in a free-market system are the faults not of free markets,
as such, but of free human beings in every sphere of action; for the most part, all
that changes from one sphere to another is the form in which these faults appear.
There might be vices that are peculiar to market relationships, vices to which
friendship and other forms of community are immune. But the converse is also
true: there are vices that are peculiar to friendship and other relationships based
on individual, ethnic, religious, or national identity, vices to which markets are
immune. One example is an objectionable form of exclusivity: friends and other
communities of identity can create a closed world from within which outsiders
are seen as potential enemies or lower life-forms.73 Markets, by contrast, are open
to everyone with something to trade; indeed, identity considerations are contrary
to market success, and hence tend to wither away in the marketplace.
3.3.
I pointed out earlier that it is a mistake to think that market norms see individuals
as mere means to business ends. I now want to argue more strongly that the oppo-
site is implicit in the idea of the fairness ethics and, indeed, that free markets and
liberty rights are ultimately justified by the recognition that people are free, self-
responsible agents, entitled to pursue their own ends, and deserving of respect as
ends in themselves. It is at least partly this recognition that prevents me from
even thinking of filching a bag of chips from the vendor’s cart, and the vendor
from calling me names for giving him soiled dollar bills. This exchange of the
moral good of mutual respect for each other as ends forms the matrix for the
exchange both of commodities and of other goods in reciprocal, voluntary
relationships. Just as the goods particular to friendship, such as affection and
companionship, ‘are not merely used but cherished and appreciated . . . [as]
expressions of shared understandings, affections, and commitments’,74 so the
moral good of mutual respect common to all types of reciprocal relationships is
not merely used, but cherished and appreciated as an expression of shared inter-
ests, understandings, and commitments.
Such mutual respect in market exchanges relates us as equals, and stands in
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stark contrast to exchange relations based on hierarchy or status, such as those
between lord and servant. The vendor sells his wares for the same price to visit-
ing lords and local plebes alike, and can tell both alike to take them or leave them.
There may well be a dignity and self-respect attached to a person’s hereditary
station in life, as some communitarians and conservatives nostalgic for the feudal
past tell us.75 But a dignity grounded in an individual’s hereditary station is, by
definition, not portable, and must be left behind should an individual’s overlord
oust him from his station. Nor is the dignity of those in a lowly station equal to
the dignity of those in an elevated station. By contrast, a dignity grounded in our
nature as free and self-responsible agents, all equally free to pursue our own
plans and equally free to enter or leave relationships, goes with us wherever we
go, and relates us to each other as equals. But a general recognition of and respect
for this dignity requires an economic and political system that enables people to
realize their nature as free and self-responsible agents. Even if the beggar and the
alms-giver both believe that, as a human being, the beggar is worth no less than
anyone else, it is hard for either of them genuinely to feel this so long as the
beggar acts like a beggar, and it is hard for the beggar to act otherwise so long as
he is a beggar.
It is not surprising, then, that it is only with the increased opportunities created
by market societies and the rule of law that the idea of the fundamental equality
of persons qua persons (an idea praised alike by Mencius, Buddhists, Stoics, and
Christians) became firmly established.76 It is instructive to note that David Hume
and Adam Smith celebrated the rise of commerce not only for bringing prosperity
to the many, but also for promoting the rule of law, liberty, and good character.77
Unlike the later romantics of feudalism, both Hume and Smith saw dependency
as creating servility.78 The new commercial society broke down the old feudal
hierarchies of power that had kept the many dependent on the few, diffusing
power by diffusing freedom and wealth and promoting the rule of law. The
increased economic opportunities and security offered by the cities freed people
of the need to stay in their clans or with their feudal lords for sustenance or pro-
tection.79 By enabling them to strike out on their own and make their own lives,
commercial society made it possible for them to earn the pride that comes from
independence and self-reliance; by breaking the shackles of inherited status, the
market order made it possible for people to see themselves as equals and ends in
themselves.
3.4.
These changes were also propitious for civic and personal friendship. In pre-
commercial societies, friends and enemies were created by custom, station, and
estate – and most strangers were potential enemies.80 The universalism of the
new commercial society created a public space characterized by a hitherto
unknown openness and friendliness. No longer potential enemies, strangers had
enough goodwill and trust to make contracts and cooperate, as well as to volun-
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tarily help each other. It was through the equality and freedom produced by com-
mercial society, then, that the civic friendship that Aristotle thought required a
good legislator became widespread and entrenched. As Hume put it, in ‘the more
polished . . . and luxurious ages’ (the ages in which people ‘flock into cities’ and
‘love to receive and communicate knowledge’, the ages in which commerce,
knowledge, and the ‘mechanical’ and ‘liberal’ ‘arts’ flourish), ‘Both sexes meet
in an easy and sociable manner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behav-
iour, refine apace. So that . . . it is impossible but they must feel an encrease of
humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each
other’s pleasure and entertainment.’81
On the personal front, commercial society reduced the prevalence of utilitarian
friendships, as well as the sort of pretend friendship found in court society, where
every detail of ‘etiquette, ceremony, taste, dress, manners, and even conversation
. . . was an instrument in the prestige-struggle’.82 Positively speaking, commercial
society enabled people from different walks of life to form friendships on what
Smith, like Aristotle, regarded as the firmest and highest grounds of all: good
character.83 The ideal of marriage based on love rather than (ironically, for those
fearful of the effects of commodification) on wealth or prestige also became wide-
spread only with the emergence of commercial societies.84 If in commercial
societies diamonds are given as a sign of love by a hopeful bridegroom-to-be, in
pre-commercial and noncommercial societies cows or gold are given as a price of
his ‘love’ by the hopeful parents of the bride-to-be. Indeed, end values in general
gained prominence in human life only with the increased wealth and leisure of
commercial societies: witness the transformation of art from a largely didactic or
religious value to a largely aesthetic value, and of the wilderness from something
to be tamed and used to something to be valued for itself.85
4. Conclusion
I have argued that the critics of market societies misunderstand both markets and
friendship by conceiving of them in radically dichotomous terms. Instrument-
ality, fungibility, impersonality, and so on come in varying degrees and charac-
terize not only market, but also nonmarket, relationships, including friendship.
Further, although market relations are primarily instrumental, they are not
entirely so, because the individuals involved are not mere means to ends. It is this
recognition that ultimately justifies the prohibition of force and fraud that is
essential to a market relationship, and free markets are the most potent social
force for promoting this recognition. Moreover, like all productive or creative
activities, market activities play an important role in a meaningful life and, thus,
are essentially structured by moral norms. For all these reasons, far from militat-
ing against friendship, market relations often give rise to friendship, and market
societies are friendlier to civic and character friendship than any other developed
form of society.
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